作者:Jesús Huerta de Soto


Jesús Huerta de Soto Ballester (Madrid, 1956) is a Spanish economist
of the Austrian School. He is a professor in the Department of Applied
Economics at King Juan Carlos University of Madrid, Spain and a Senior
Fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Huerta de Soto received a bachelor’s degree in economics in 1978 and a
PhD in economics in 1992, from Complutense University. His MBA in
actuarial science is from Stanford University, 1985. In 2000 he became
a full professor of Political Economy at Universidad Rey Juan Carlos
in Madrid.
Huerta de Soto was Editor of seven volumes of the Spanish language
version of the University of Chicago Press’s The Collected Works of
F.A. Hayek. In that capacity, he was responsible for bibliographies,
footnotes, introductions, and hiring translators. He is a member of
the editorial board of New Perspectives on Political Economy and on
the advisory editorial board of the Journal of Markets and Morality.
Huerta de Soto is a Senior Fellow of the Ludwig von Mises Institute
and is on the editorial board of its Quarterly Journal of Austrian
Economics. He was formerly a Trustee of the Madrid Institute for
Advanced Studies (IMDEA) in social sciences and was a vice-president
and director of the Mont Pelerin Society from 2000 to 2004.


巴别塔经哲读书会八月份的需求阅读书目,本书形如奥地利(Austria)医学派的简介手册,让读者对学派有八个圆满的了然,书中任重(英文名:rèn zhòng)而道远和新古典经济学派、社会主义实行了系统的差距性分析,列举了学派发展的历史阶段和关键人物,读的英文版,大批量的专业性词汇也是边读边背。




time preference
是奥地利共和国(The Republic of Austria)学派建议来的,非凡有意思的定义,企管有时候正是和谐协会的
time preference 的能力。




上次参预鲁克Alan德读书会移动的时候提到的3个难点,关于垄断和翻新之间是或不是存在顶牛性,能够越发延展到奥地利共和国(Republik Österreich)学派设想的经济条件下研商:自由集镇环境下(不存在其余机构性强迫),集团的垄断行为是或不是会减小创新作为的发生?那样的环境下专利和垄断的涉嫌是什么样的?集团家精神和更新的涉及里面是不是有肯定的关联?




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www.7376.com ,Austrians are particularly critical of the narrow concept of economics
which originated with Robbins and his well-known definition of the
subject. In his own words, “economics is the science which studies human
behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have
alternative uses” (Robbins 1932, 16). Robbins’s conception implicitly
presupposes a given knowledge of ends and means and reduces the economic
problem to a technical problem of mere allocation, maximization or
optimization, subject to certain restrictions which are also assumed
known. In other words, Robbins’s concept of economics reflects the
essence of the neoclassical paradigm and can be considered completely
foreign to the methodology of the  Austrian school as it is understood
today. Indeed, Robbins portrays man as an automaton, a simple caricature
of a human being, who may only react passively to events. In contrast
with this view, Mises, Kirzner and the rest of the  Austrian school
maintain that man does not so much allocate given means to given ends,
as constantly seek new ends and means, while learning from the past and
using his imagination to discover and create the future (via action).
 Thus, for  Austrians, economics forms part of a much broader and more
general science, a general theory of human action (and not of human
decision or choice).  According to Hayek, if for this general science of
human action “a name is needed, the term  praxeological sciences now
clearly defined and extensively used by Ludwig von Mises, would appear
to be most appropriate” (Hayek 1952a, 209).


Economics is not about things and tangible material objects; it is about
men, their meanings and actions. Goods, commodities, and wealth and all
the other notions of conduct are not elements of nature; they are
elements of human meaning and conduct. He who wants to deal with them
must not look at the external world; he must search for them in the
meaning of acting men. (Mises 1996, 92)


For the above reasons, members of the  Austrian school find that many of
the theories and conclusions that neoclassicals form in their analysis
of consumption and production make no sense in terms of economics. One
example is the “law of equality of price-weighted marginal utilities”,
which rests on very shaky theoretical foundations. In fact this law
presupposes that the actor is able to simultaneously assess the utility
of all goods at their disposal, and it overlooks the fact that every
action is sequential and creative, and that goods are not assessed at
the same time by equalizing their supposed marginal utilities, but
rather one after the other, within the context of different stages and
actions, for each of which the corresponding marginal utility may be not
only different but incomparable (Mayer 1994, 81–3)


The great merit of the  Austrians is to have demonstrated that it is
perfectly possible to develop the entire corpus of economic theory in a
logical manner, while introducing the concepts of time and creativity
 (praxeology); that is, without any need of functions nor assumptions of
constancy which do not fit in with the creative nature of human beings,
who are the only true protagonists of social processes, the object of
research in economics.


et us bear in mind that it fully agrees with the original etymological
meaning of the word “enterprise” (empresa in Spanish). Indeed both the
Spanish word  empresa and the French and English word  entrepreneur
derive etymologically from the Latin verb  in prehendo-endi-ensum, which
means “to discover, to see, to perceive, to realize, to capture”; and
the Latin term  in prehensa clearly implies action and means “to take,
to seize”. In short,  empresa is synonymous with action


We  could also cite, following Polanyi, the example of a person who is
learning to ride a bicycle and attempts to maintain their balance by
moving the handlebars to the side toward which they begin to fall,
creating in this way a centrifugal force which tends to keep the bicycle
upright; yet almost no cyclist is aware of or familiar with the physical
principles behind this ability. On the contrary, what the cyclist
actually uses is a “sense of balance”, which in some way informs them
how to behave at each moment to keep from falling. Polanyi goes so far
as to assert that tacit knowledge is in fact the dominant principle of
all knowledge (Polanyi 1959, 24–5). Even the most highly formalized and
scientific knowledge invariably follows from an intuition or an act of
creation, which are simply manifestations of tacit knowledge. Moreover
the new knowledge we can acquire through formulas, books, charts, maps
and so on is important mainly because it helps us to reorganize our
entire framework of practical, entrepreneurial information from
different and increasingly rich and valuable perspectives, which in turn
opens up new possibilities for the exercise of creative intuition.
 Therefore the impossibility of articulating practical knowledge
manifests itself not only “statically”, in the sense that any apparently
articulated statement contains information only insofar as it is
interpreted through a combination of prior, inarticulable beliefs and
knowledge, but also “dynamically”, since the mental process used in any
attempt at formalized articulation is itself essentially tacit,
inarticulable knowledge.


Another type of knowledge that cannot be articulated and that plays an
essential role in the functioning of society is composed of the set of
habits, traditions, institutions, and juridical and moral rules that
comprise the law that make society possible, and that human beings learn
to follow, though we cannot articulate in detail nor theorize about the
precise functions that these rules and institutions perform in the
various situations and social processes in which they are involved.

  1.各个令人眼花缭乱的食物=the bewildering variety of

The exercise of entrepreneurship does not require any means.  That is to
say, entrepreneurship does not entail any costs and is therefore
fundamentally creative.  This creative aspect of entrepreneurship is
embodied in its production of a type of profit which, in a sense, arises
out of nothing, and which we shall therefore refer to as pure
entrepreneurial profit.  To  derive entrepreneurial profit one needs no
prior means, but only to exercise entrepreneurship well. It is
particularly important to emphasize that any act of entrepreneurship
brings about three extraordinarily significant effects. First,
entrepreneurship creates new information. Second, this information is
transmitted throughout the market.  Third, the entrepreneurial act
teaches each of the economic agents involved to tune their behavior to
the needs of the others.  These consequences of entrepreneurship, as the
authors of the  Austrian school have analytically formulated them, are
so important that they are worth studying closely one by one.

  2.从认知的角度明白=in cognitive terms,个中in

Each entrepreneurial act entails the  ex nihilo creation of new
information or knowledge.  This creation takes place in the mind of the
person who initially exercises entrepreneurship. Indeed when a person we
shall call “C” realizes that a profit opportunity exists, new
information is created in his mind. Furthermore once “C” takes action
and contacts, for instance, “A” and “B”, and buys cheaply from “B” a
resource that “B” has too much of and then sells it at a higher price to
“A”, who needs it urgently, new information is also created in the minds
of “A” and “B”. “A” realizes that the resource she lacked and needed so
desperately to accomplish her end is available elsewhere in the market
in greater quantities than she had thought, and that therefore she can
now readily undertake the action she had not initiated before due to the
absence of this resource. For his part, “B” realizes that the resource
he so abundantly possesses yet did not value is keenly desired by other
people, and that therefore he should save and protect it, since he can
sell it at a good price.



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